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ABSTRACT 
 
Through a study which took place on Koh Phi Phi Island, Thailand between 2005 and 
2011, concerning the influence of political economy and conceptualisations of 
sustainability upon post disaster reconstruction, the author attempts to fill the void 
expressed by numerous commentators who have highlighted a relative lack of 
academic attention directly addressing the influence of political economy on 
achieving sustainability in post-disaster reconstruction. In existing academic debates 
concerning the political economy of post-disaster reconstruction, there appears a trend 
towards ‘disaster capitalism’ (Klein, 2005: 3), ‘smash and grab capitalism’ (Harvey, 
2007: 32) or ‘attempts to accumulate by dispossession’ (Saltman, 2007a: 57). This 
research observes however, that this did not occur on Phi Phi Island post Asian 
tsunami of December 2004. Despite claims of a ‘clean slate’ being offered by the 
tsunami in developmental terms, this research provides evidence and explanation of 
why this did not and would not exist on Phi Phi, a finding that may be applied to other 
destinations in a post-disaster context.  Furthermore, in response to Blaikie et al.’s 
(2004) concerns that vulnerability is often reconstructed following a disaster and may 
create the conditions for a future disaster; this work has extended discussions of 
disaster vulnerability through an adapted application of Turner et al.’s (2003) 
Vulnerability Framework, presenting a post-disaster situation that remains highly 
vulnerable and non-conducive to sustainability. The author draws on the notion of 
‘strategic drift’ (Johnson, 1998: 179) and ‘boiled frog syndrome’ (Richardson, 
Nwankwo and Richardson, 1994: 10) to explain how host attitudes to tourism may 
increase vulnerability. Both these contributions may assist in identifying destination 
vulnerability and limitations in disaster response and recovery.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the pursuit of sustainability 
within tourism development planning (Kingsbury et al., 2004; Swarbrooke, 2000).  
The discourse surrounding such development has focused upon the need for informed 
consent and stakeholder involvement (Mowforth and Munt, 2003) but, as Pleumarom 
(1999) has argued, this ideology can become compromised when global forces 
conflict with local interests. The interplay of international political economy and 
conflicting global and local interests becomes vividly exposed in the context of 
developing nations (Stubbs and Underhill, 2006) and, in particular, situations where 
natural disasters produce an alleged ‘clean slate’ upon which to plan the post-disaster 
reconstruction (Klein, 2005; Klein 2008; Tangwisutijit and Warunpitikul, 2005).  
However, there have been few published empirical academic works directly 
addressing the influence of political economy upon achieving sustainability in post-
disaster reconstruction (Klein, 2008).  Where such research does exist, it suggests the 
increased takeover of global powers in the reconstruction effort as has been evident in 
not only post-tsunami reconstruction in Thailand, Sri Lanka and India, but Caribbean 
and Middle-Eastern states post-9-11 (Klein, 2005; 2008).  
 
The Asian tsunami of December 2004 left a long-lasting global footprint (Rice, 2005). 
This event was locally devastating, but also lingered in the global consciousness 
because of the intense media coverage, and the fact that many of the areas affected 
were those we have personal familiarity with through tourism (ibid., 2005). The 
factual, physical reasons for this were those instrumental in the total devastation of 
affected areas. Nevertheless, religious justification was also proffered. The Buddhist 
religion, as widely practised in areas across the affected region (the Andaman coast), 
and increasingly so on the island of Phi Phi due to the influx of migrant workers from 
other parts of Thailand, would suggest that the tsunami revealed divine anger with 
man and his use of the land, and that this disaster was a cleansing process associated 
with bad karma attributed to past actions (Harvey, 2001).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that, if any benefit could be derived from the disaster, it 
was the recognition of the impact of high-density, poorly planned and unsustainable 
tourism infrastructure that many of these destinations had prior to the tsunami (UNDP 
and World Bank, 2005; FAO 10 January 2005, Bangkok Post, 29/12/04; Pleumarom, 
2004; Cummings, 2005).  This sentiment was mirrored by a CNN report: ‘if there was 
a saving grace to the tragedy…. it was the opportunity left by the devastation to build 
anew in areas that had been developed in environmentally and socially unjust ways’ 
(4 December 2005). It was thought by some that the tsunami provided a ‘clean slate’ 
in developmental terms (CNN, 2005; UNEP, 2005). Furthermore, it was clear that 
there were a wealth of options as to how the affected destinations could be 
redeveloped in the future, to correlate with more sustainable practices (UNEP New 
Frontiers Vol. 11, No.1). 
  
It was thus of interest to assess the redevelopment process, through a naturally 
occurring case study that allowed examination of the influence of political and 
economic factors upon achieving sustainable development within the context of 
tourism and natural disasters. The case study chosen was that of Phi Phi island, 
Thailand, a popular backpacker and day-tripper destination, the epitome of a paradise 
location (Fahn, 2003; Cummings 2005), which, when struck by the Asian tsunami of 
December 2004, suffered a tremendous loss of life and vast destruction of island 
infrastructure to support both tourism and local livelihoods (Cummings, 2005; 
Altman, 2005; Bergman, 2005). Historically, the development of Phi Phi, including 
tourism, had been subject to widespread criticism (Fahn, 2003; Byrne et al., 2005; 
Hart, 2005; Cummings, 2005; Dodds, Graci and Holmes, 2010), due to the 
unsustainable nature of infrastructure development and lack of strict regulation and 
planning, particularly with regard to an alleged ‘sell-out’ of the Phi Phi Le’s Maya 
Bay (part of Hat Noppharat Thara National Marine Park) following the filming of 
Fox’s motion picture The Beach (Cummings, 2005; Laopaisarntaksin, 1998; 
Puthipucha, 1998; Noikorn, 1998; Ekachai, 1998; Ing. K, 1998; Fuengprichavai, 
1998; Techawongtham, 1998; Hongthong, 1998; Lonely Planet, 2004: 348). 
 
 
Figure 1: Map to illustrate the location of the Phi Phi islands within the Krabi 
Province (Source: http://www.ko-phiphi.com/maps/ accessed 24.03.2011) 
 
 
This island group, incorporated into the Hat Noppharat Thara National Marine Park in 
1983 is located within the Ao Nang sub-district of the Krabi Province of southern 
Thailand, 42 kilometres from the holiday mecca of Phuket and 38 kilometres from the 
provincial capital, Krabi Town (www.phi-phi.com), as illustrated within Figure 1 
above. They represent another addition to the great number of island and beach 
destinations in southern Thailand, which include Koh Samui, Koh Phuket, Koh Phan 
Ngan and Koh Tao, which developed beginning in the 1980s to support tourism 
activities (Konisranakul and Tuaycharoen, 2010).  Phi Phi is within easy travelling 
distance (by boat) of both Phuket and Krabi, the journey taking approximately ninety 
minutes. Despite being more accessible in recent times, the islands bear similarities to 
Cohen’s (1983) description of Koh Samui in the 1980s: they are little incorporated 
into the national society and only superficially controlled by the national civil 
administration and police. 
  
Whilst prior to the tsunami, the island was widely criticised for unsustainable 
development planning (Rice, 2005; Fahn, 2003; Byrne et al., 2005; Hart, 2005; 
Cummings, 2005; Dodds, Graci and Holmes, 2010), after the tsunami there seemed, at 
the outset, the opportunity for reconstruction to occur along more sustainable lines. 
Pleumarom (2004:2), a Thailand-based academic, suggested that in the reconstruction 
phase, the political context in which tourism was being promoted also needed to be 
critically re-examined: ‘As the Government seems set to nurture a tourism 
monoculture again ... would it not be the time to explore strategies to reduce the 
dependencies on tourism, diversify the economy and build more secure and 
sustainable livelihoods for the majority of the people?’ Certainly, the Thai 
government presented Phi Phi as requiring ‘total restoration’ following the tsunami. 
In this respect, initial moves in the redevelopment already suggested a complex 
scenario may be unfolding. The Thai government indicated that it wished Phi Phi to 
retain its concept as a paradise island, promising redevelopment of a lower density to 
preserve the dual bay views in line with sustainable tourism principles.  
 
Further debates concerning the redevelopment plans were elaborated by Tangwisutijit 
and Warunpitikul (2005:9), for instance: ‘the devastation wrought by the Tsunami on 
Phi Phi island is known around the world, yet there are much quieter efforts underway 
that could result in further dramatic changes to the island’s landscape.’ On the 
surface, the new look planned for Phi Phi was an environmentalist’s delight. It called 
for the elimination of all permanent concrete structures from the space between the 
famous twin-bay beachfronts of Tonsai and Ao Lo Dalaam. Thailand’s iconic tropical 
paradise would be restored to its natural beauty. The new plan, however, left many 
island residents and business operators who survived the tsunami feeling as if they 
would be threatened with yet another disaster.  
 
This alleged ‘clean-slate’ situation and the ensuing redevelopment, then, presented the 
opportunity for research to consider what shape stakeholders would wish tourism to 
take in the post-tsunami era, and to look at what opportunities were presented 
following commencement of the rebuild of island infrastructure. Using a political 
economy framework interlinked with other evaluative frameworks, Phi Phi offered a 
rare opportunity to see which political, economic and cultural factors shaped the 
planning of tourism development and, importantly, whether actual practice mirrored 
the principles of sustainability. Furthermore, the research presented the opportunity to 
explore the concerns raised by researchers such as Klein (2005; 2008) and Pleumarom 
(2004; 2005), amongst others, to investigate whether affected areas appear to be set to 
be re-designed by a range of governments, private companies, non-governmental 
organisations and members of think tanks in a manner that often does not consult 
local communities. The research considered whether Phi Phi's development plans 
were adapted post-tsunami to ensure the long-term economic, environmental and 
social sustainability of the destination. Could the types of political and developmental 
concerns, processes and structures described by Klein (2005; 2008) be related to what 
was taking place in Phi Phi or not? If they could not, why was this?  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this research, it was not the intention to facilitate replication, but to unearth richer 
and deeper interpretive understanding of the perceptions of tourism stakeholders in 
Phi Phi. Subsequently, an inductive aproach was used to permit the ‘multiple realities’ 
held by the island’s stakeholders to emerge, rather than a deductive approach which 
seeks to prove or disprove hypothesis (Veal, 2006). This also assisted in tempering 
any bias introduced by the researcher’s own ‘self’ by beginning free from pre-
conceived views.  
 
The research adopted a mixed method, case study approach as a means of providing a 
holistic, in-depth investigation and the provision of a test site for theory building 
based on the perspectives of all main stakeholders. As Denscombe (2003: 30) argues, 
case studies allow a range of methods to be utilised in order to be reactive to meet 
research needs and leads to a detailed study of one particular instance or situation. 
The characteristics of a case study allow unique insight into the case study and a 
holistic view to be sought, most appropriate for the nature of this research focused 
upon a single destination.  
 
Methods included online research, comprising the design and operation of a tailored 
website to overcome geographical and access limitations; and offline methods such as 
visual techniques to monitor change and confirm opinions offered by participants of 
the research; in-depth face-to-face interviews with hand-picked stakeholders of Phi 
Phi’s development; open-ended questionnaires with tourists; and extended answer 
Thai script questionnaires in order to overcome language barriers and present the 
‘Thai voice’. The primary data was gathered from April 2006-December 2011 
including a period working at The Prince of Songkla University in Phuket (June-
December 2006). 
 
The table below details the phases of fieldwork and mix of methods employed. 
 
Period Context Data Collected 
PHASE ONE 
(I) October 
2005 
To analyse selected web discussion 
fora to elicit key themes and 
contacts 
Development of a specific research 
website and online questionnaires 
Qualitative data from web 
discussion threads 
Eleven online open-ended 
questionnaires completed 
(II) April 2006 
– Three weeks 
of fieldwork 
To conduct preliminary (pilot) 
interviews and secure employment 
in Thailand to fund the main period 
of data collection. 
To generate contacts – key 
informants 
Five in-depth pilot interviews 
with development 
stakeholders 
Observational and visual data 
Generation of contacts and 
networks 
Reflexive journal and 
observational notes 
PHASE TWO 
(I) June 2006-
December 2006 
 Six months of 
fieldwork 
To live and work within the field 
To be sensitised to the internal and 
external environments of the field 
Main phase of primary data 
collection 
21 in-depth interviews 
Progressive observational 
and visual data collection to 
document change 
Policy documents for 
regional and destination 
specific development plans 
Phi Phi Island master plan 
Reflexive journal and 
observational notes 
(II) December 
2007 – two 
weeks of 
fieldwork 
To document change in the island’s 
infrastructure 
To gather further primary data in 
the form of interview, visual and 
documentary sources. 
 
To photograph the island, 
documenting change 
To gather film footage 
To contribute to the reflexive 
journal and observational 
notes 
(III) April 2008 
– three weeks 
Three weeks of immersion in the 
field to gather further primary data 
38 extended answer Thai 
script written interviews with 
of fieldwork and explore emerging themes with 
stakeholders of Phi Phi’s 
development 
residents, business owners 
and operatives of Phi Phi 
76 open answer 
questionnaires to island 
visitors 
Photography and film to 
document change 
Reflexive journal 
 
Table 1: The phases of primary data collection 
 
The in depth interviews followed a structured format initially, with flexibility should 
the researcher wish to pursue a topic in more detail. The initial questions of the pilot 
study were adapted as it was found that a highly structured approach resulted in a 
more descriptive account of the island’s development, which could easily be sought 
within documentary and secondary data. Subsequent interviews used a semi-
structured format, using the research questions as a guide, to ensure that the data 
collection fulfilled the goals of the research. As all interviews were face-to-face, 
technical terminology could be explained by the researcher as necessary. In total, 26 
in-depth interviews were conducted between April and November 2006, using a 
combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques based upon stakeholder 
theory (Swarbrooke, 1999; Weaver and Lawton, 2002). Respondents were selected 
purposively and on the basis of their role and familiarity with Phi Phi. 
 
Research in the literature and observations from initial field visits suggested that one 
of the greatest influencing factors in shaping the island’s future development was the 
tourist market. Therefore, in order to ascertain the typology of tourists visiting Phi Phi 
to comprehend the nature of demand and subsequent impacts of tourism (in line with 
proposals made by Plog (2001), Wickens (2002) and Cohen (1979)), a snapshot, 
convenience-sampled, short-answer questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire 
was designed provide a profile of the tourists visiting the island, and to learn more 
about the needs, motivations and desires of the tourist market at this time, as was 
similarly undertaken by Dodds et al. (2010) approximately six months later. The 
questions posed therefore had these goals in mind. The questionnaire was designed to 
be short for ease of completion, as respondents were approached in a variety of 
environments including the beach, ferries, restaurants, bars and in tourist 
accommodation.  The majority of questions were open-ended to solicit unbiased 
responses. 
 
Prior experience working in Thailand and as elaborated through the literature, has 
highlighted limitations with both online surveys and face-to-face interviews, in the 
sense that respondents may answer to please. This issue, in addition to language 
barriers, was further addressed during phase two (April 2008), whereby research 
questions translated into Thai script were developed and handed by the researcher to 
38 inhabitants of Koh Phi. These questions were pre-tested with a Thai colleague to 
ensure comprehension. These questionnaires were left with the respondents for half a 
day or a whole day, to enable them to write a full, unbiased response in Thai. This 
went some way toward overcoming language barriers and biases introduced through 
the face-to-face interviews (which were predominantly in English), and also enabled 
respondents to express themselves clearly their own language. However, other 
influences and biases are introduced through the use of convenience sampling such as 
willingness to participate in the study and visibility within the community (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless the researcher was satisfied that the sample fairly 
represented the views of Phi Phi’s Thai inhabitants due to the settings in which the 
respondents were identified. The responses were translated by a native Thai 
colleague. 
 
Banks (2002; 2005) discusses the use of visual data, including photography as a 
‘visual notebook’. Most certainly, in a study seeking to document change, and project 
future change, this method would seem highly appropriate. Film and photography 
may be used to gain understanding of societies and cultural forms (Edwards, 1992) 
and the study of spatial behaviour (Hockings, 1995). Within this research therefore, 
this method was used in combination with other data collection techniques as detailed. 
The purpose of using visual data was to document change over time (2006-2011) and 
to validate observational field notes and interview data. Banks (2005) discusses how 
images may be used. The photography in this research was not intended as visual 
anthropology, but rather as a visual record and aide memoire (Knowles and 
Sweetman, 2005). 
 
FINDINGS 
 
From the data, twenty-five dominant themes arose. These themes provided a detailed 
insight into the issues of significance to Phi Phi Island’s stakeholders in respect of its 
future development. The reason that data was considered both generally and 
segregated according to respondent group is to elaborate how individual views differ 
from that of a consensus view.  
 
Despite Klein’s (2005; 2008) claims of ‘disaster capitalism’, there was minimal 
evidence found of this at an international or national level. Claims of an increased 
takeover of global powers and a dangerous level of power held by multinationals are 
not apparent in this localised case study. There is a trend in Thailand for high-end 
tourism; however, this is not exclusively pursued through selling out to international 
hotel chains, and in fact this is restricted by policies favouring national interest (Noy, 
2011; Konisranukul and Tuaycharoen, 2010; Krutwaysho and Bramwell, 2010) and a 
focus upon what can be regarded an inward facing ‘sufficiency economy’ (Noy, 2011; 
Krongkaew, 2004). Where there are international hotel chains on Phi Phi (e.g. 
Intercontinental Hotels Group through their Holiday Inn brand), development has 
taken place considerately, in association with Thai landowners, further strengthening 
landowners’ control over the future development of the island, through the 
establishment of international bonds and support structures, an example of local elites 
perpetuating their own interests under dependency theory. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of plans on Phi Phi to privatise utilities at a local level. There has been a loss 
of local control on Phi Phi, which occurred in the early 1990s when the traditional 
inhabitants sold their land to wealthy business people from the mainland. There is 
limited evidence of the ‘radical social and economic engineering’ that Klein (2005; 
2008) speaks of. 
 
Far more fitting for the case of Phi Phi would be the considerations of Pleumarom 
(1999), and Bradshaw (2002), who note the inequalities that exist within society and 
the influence that these have over developmental outcomes. Inequalities are certainly 
apparent on Phi Phi. Those who own land on the island, and specifically the major 
landowners have the greatest influence over development. One may argue that there 
may have been a desire to ‘capitalise’ on the disaster, as the government has been 
accused of trying to do, but this was not borne out. Bradshaw’s (2002) observations 
would be most apt for the situation on Phi Phi, that, ‘reconstruction processes are not 
newly constructed in the light of the disaster but are the result of existing power 
struggles and structures’. Scheyvens (2002) added strength to this argument, 
highlighting due to the complex interplay of class, values and power that exists at a 
destination level, it ultimately may result in a lack of equitable participation and 
consultation in planning for tourism. This would certainly appear to be the case on Phi 
Phi, whereby, on account of economic power and landownership, the key players in 
shaping the future of Phi Phi’s development are the landowners. The ladder of 
influence that exists on Phi Phi is illustrated below. It can be seen that the desires 
being realised in the island’s development are those of the groups towards the apex of 
the pyramid. 
 
 
Model 1: Illustration of the structure of influence in Phi Phi’s development 
(author’s own from data) 
The landowners’ level of influence over the development of Phi Phi undoubtedly 
arose as one of the strongest themes within the research. Commentators explain how 
traditional landowners were tempted to sell and how land was acquired by wealthy 
business people from Phuket, Krabi and Bangkok. Nowadays there are few traditional 
inhabitants left, and if they do remain, they do not own land. Many will say that they 
are local but when one traces their background, they are usually businessmen from 
Phuket or Krabi. Many respondents appeared fearful of the links between big business 
and the government. Power, on Phi Phi, would appear to lie with four major 
landowners, whose power appears to surpass that of the government and on whom all 
other inhabitants are dependent in some way, mainly because these landowners hold 
approximately 80% of the land in the central ‘apple core’ area and the majority of 
shops and businesses are on rented land. 
 
There would further appear to be evidence of hegemonic relationships within Phi 
Phi’s redevelopment. Brohman (1996) claims that, ‘there is a well-known tendency of 
local elites to appropriate the organs of participation for their own benefit’, and one 
can see that these structures exist on Phi Phi. Phi Phi is essentially governed by a 
small group of ruling elite and, as Calgaro (2005) argues, it is the agenda of these 
people that shape development within a destination. It may initially appear that the 
government’s position is weak in relation to these landowners, as a respondent from 
the Provincial Government would like one to believe, and certainly illegal building  
ad National Park encroachment would suggest that is the case. However, the research 
findings are indicative in some cases of, links between the landowners on the island 
and provincial government, so one can see that (albeit indirectly) government does 
have an influence.  
 Findings indicate that landowners acquire their power through economic strength, 
which enables them to purchase land. The ownership of land and material wealth 
ensures that they attain a higher level within the structure of society on Phi Phi, as 
other islanders are dependent upon them. Few landowners are native to Phi Phi and 
have attained a certain level of education either internationally or nationally, which 
places them intellectually in a stronger position to engage in debate and be active 
participants in planning meetings and as such to leverage their views in regional and 
national fora. Their position within society enables them to diffuse their views within 
the community, resulting in intellectual and moral leadership, heightened by sending 
their offspring overseas to be educated within a Western system who then are actively 
linked into global networks and as such can draw upon global knowledge pools 
(Zeldin, 1995; Hannam, 2002). Thus, planning meetings, despite being alleged to be, 
are non-participatory on account of ‘intellectual leadership’ of the landowners and the 
Thai cultural notions of ‘face’ and ‘status’. The landowners were likened by some 
respondents to the Mafia-style strong families who characterised the island of Samui 
in the 1980s (Cohen, 1983). There is evidence of collaboration between landowners 
and the international tourism industry to further strengthen their ties and bargaining 
power. Model 2 provides a conceptual illustration of the basis on which landowners 
achieve and maintain their level of influence within Phi Phi’s development.  
  
 
 
 
Model 2: Illustration of the factors governing the landowners’ level of influence 
over Phi Phi’s development (author’s own from data) 
 
In the literature surrounding the political economy of post-disaster reconstruction it 
became evident that there were two clear schools of thought concerning Koh Phi Phi’s 
reconstruction: firstly, that the tsunami had created a ‘clean slate’ and hence 
opportunity should be taken to pursue a more sustainable future; and secondly that 
global neoliberal policies have incited a trend towards disaster capitalism, in which 
disaster capitalists would use desperation and fear created by catastrophe to engage in 
radical re-engineering of affected areas. Neither school of thought has been wholly 
correct in respect of Phi Phi. These outcomes are strongly influenced by the political 
Poor governance 
Status 
Intellectual leadership 
Bonds and ties 
Fear 
economy of the island and as such make the experiences on Phi Phi a contribution to 
the existing knowledge on post-disaster tourism redevelopment. 
 
Although this research did demonstrate a desire by the Thai government to capitalise 
on the disaster in the sense of reclaiming encroached land and changing the face of 
the island to pursue a lower-density, high-end model, the tsunami did not, as Klein 
(2008), Bradshaw (2002), Saltman (2007), Harvey (2007) and Ayub and Cruikshank 
(1979) predicted, reflect a growing trend in disaster capitalism. The research explored 
why that did not occur. The table below elaborates the evidence of ‘disaster 
capitalism’ in tourism destinations post-tsunami, the manner in which these 
experiences were or were not present on Phi Phi and a subsequent explanation of why 
this was the case. It can be seen that the tsunami did present the opportunity for 
disaster capitalism but the political economy surrounding Thai tourism development 
and development on Phi Phi did not permit this to happen. 
 
Characteristic of 
disaster 
capitalism (taken 
from existing 
debates) 
Presence post-tsunami Presence and influence on Phi Phi  
Shock event Earthquake off west coast of 
Sumatra measuring over 9 
on the Richter scale 
Sea receded to 100 metres 
from the Andaman coast for 
about five minutes; three 
staggered waves hit the 
Andaman Coast, up to 10m 
in height; one hour 
inundation 
5395 Killed 
2817 missing 
58,550 affected 
120,000+ lost livelihoods in 
tourism 
3m (10ft) wave hit from Tonsai Bay 
5.5m (18ft) wave hit from Ao Lo Dalaam 
Devastated low-lying land 
70% of buildings destroyed 
 
850 bodies (approx.) recovered 
1500 missing 
 
The tsunami had a profound effect on the 
central area of Phi Phi Don Island, 
destroying 70% of the infrastructure and 
presenting what was considered by some to 
be a blank canvas 
The disaster was characteristic of a low 
intensity, low threat, low control event with 
limited response options, shock event 
Slate wiped clean Mass evacuation plan in Sri 
Lanka, displaced fishing 
communities 1km inland 
Rules imposed on fishing 
communities in Sri Lanka 
and Khao Lak in Thailand 
forbade rebuilding for 
‘safety’ reasons 
Communities in Ban 
Namken, Ban Laem-pon, 
and Tubtawan forcibly 
removed from coastal homes 
70% of infrastructure in the ‘apple core’ 
destroyed 
Islanders evacuated for a month following 
the Tsunami, accommodated in disparate 
locations across the Krabi province and in 
refugee camps 
Rubble cleared 
30m setback imposed 
New inland homes provided 
Resistance, delays and inaction resulted in 
islanders ‘forging ahead’ with rebuilding 
the island despite ban on construction 
A clean slate can never exist in 
development terms unless ‘terra nullius’ as 
the landscapes of development that 
preceded the tsunami cannot and will not 
be erased.  
The tsunami has shown the challenges that 
face this community in ‘high colour’ 
Strong political-economic structures at a 
local level on Phi Phi Don resisted 
government plans  
Strong support from the international 
backpacker and volunteer community 
strengthened resistance 
Increased 
takeover of 
global powers 
Ambiguity in foreign 
ownership laws in Thailand 
Foreigners cannot own land 
in Thailand, but can own 
buildings separate from the 
land 
Thailand restricts and 
prohibits economical areas 
and business categories for 
foreigners primarily in the 
Foreign Business Act 
(A.D.1999).  
Sector specific legislation on 
foreign ownership of 49% 
stake 
Many ‘loopholes’ 
 
Multinational hotel chain Intercontinental 
develops as the management company of 
the Holiday Inn through co-operation with 
local landowner 
High levels of control are maintained by 
dominant landowners through status, 
predominantly ‘outsiders’ (Thais who are 
not native of the area – Cohen, 1983) 
Islanders are rushing to rebuild homes to 
avoid any claim on the land by wealthy 
families  
Anti-liberalisation stance and emphasis on 
‘sufficiency economy’ places power back 
in the nation of Thailand 
Strong socio-political structures created by 
major landowners prevented takeover 
 
Increase in 
multinationals 
Set back or ‘buffer’ zone 
policy of 100m imposed in 
Sri Lanka represents a state-
sponsored dislocation of 
coastal populations 
10m setback policy for 
hotels 
Presence of multinationals arises from co-
operation between landowners and foreign 
operators and shows dependency theory. 
At present Intercontinental have two 
developments on the island using this 
means but these are in the Laem Tong 
area, not Tonsai  
The Thai government has 
liquidated public land 
holdings in tsunami-affected 
areas. In Nai Lai the local 
government has sold 240 
acres of public land to 
developers, and 1,800 acres 
has been bought from 
villagers. Rather than 
favouring Multinationals 
this favours big business in 
Thailand.  
Pursuit of high-end tourism across 
Thailand. On Phi Phi this is realised in the 
northern and eastern beaches although it 
does not involve solely multinational 
corporations. 
Phi Phi Island Village and Zeavola are 
considered ‘high-end’ however there is no 
involvement of international capital, 
moreso favouring national ‘big business’ 
 
Extreme 
capitalist 
takeover 
Tourist resorts in Sri Lanka 
and Khao Lak exempted 
from the buffer zone ruling 
as works classified as 
‘repair’; used as a means to 
acquire land  
Phi Phi differs from Khao Lak in that the 
central part of the island (80% of which) is 
owned by a small collection of landowners 
who form a strong resistance against 
capitalist takeover in the same sense as 
other tsunami affected locations such as 
Sri Lanka, however these landowners can 
be seen as the capitalists themselves. 
Ownership has not shifted therefore 
following the tsunami, capitalist takeover 
occurred on Phi Phi in the 1980s 
Reconstruction 
loans with 
crippling 
conditions for the 
privatisation of 
industry 
The Thai government 
refused ‘disaster relief’ only 
accepting ‘technical 
assistance’ in light of a 
resistance to be bound to 
neoliberal measures 
imposed by the World Bank 
post-Asian Financial Crisis 
Focus on ‘sufficiency economy’ pioneered 
by the King, focuses upon fostering 
national interests 
General populace against neoliberalism 
post-Asian Crisis experience 
Resultant inward facing development 
programmes favour national interest over 
external assistance 
Funds for the reconstruction of the island 
generated predominantly through private 
capital (landowners) and volunteer 
fundraising retained local ownership 
Highlights 
existing power 
relationships and 
the inequalities 
that exist within 
society 
Unveiled complexity of land 
rights problems in Thailand 
Presented delays in reclaiming land by 
original owners and identifying who held 
the title deeds 
Landowners asserted power by reclaiming 
land from tenants for new developments as 
new terms of lease were established 
resulting in erosion of trust and strong 
community bonds 
Used by power 
brokers to 
profiteer  
Land seized, ownership 
rights to coastal land 
claimed by development 
companies with close 
governmental links 
This took place on Phi Phi long before the 
tsunami. Wealthy investors made 
connections with indigenous landowners in 
the 1980s, who would be willing to make 
land claims on the investor’s behalf. Title 
deeds claimed under the pretence that the 
land was being used for farming 
Table 1: A summary of why Phi Phi avoided ‘disaster capitalism’ (Sources: Author’s 
empirical research; Klein, 2008; Bradshaw, 2002; Saltman, 2007; Kaewkuntee, 2006; 
Rigg et al., 2005; Scott, 1985; Rice, 2005; Department for Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Ministry of Interior, Thailand, 2004) 
 
The opportunity was presented to consider an alternative form of tourism (as it 
appears the government wanted), but this was not taken. The tsunami did not change 
the island’s appeal, but rather continued poor environmental practices and poor 
building regulations, which continue to decrease the beauty of Phi Phi. This may be 
on account of concerns that the secondary impacts of the tsunami would be almost as 
destructive as the tsunami itself i.e. loss of earnings and livelihoods from the tourism 
industry. It is no wonder, therefore, that the islanders chose to rebuild their lives the 
only way they know how, and tourism was the key shaping influence post-tsunami. 
As academic commentators have observed, an event on this scale has the potential to 
radically transform structures and processes, representing a break in the trajectories of 
existence (Rigg et al., 2005). This research has shown that to suggest a ‘clean slate’ 
existed is unrealistic and would be unlikely to exist in development terms post 
disaster. An explanation of why is given below: 
 
Reasons why ‘clean slate’ opportunity 
could not be taken 
Evidence 
Prevailing development philosophy on 
the island pre-tsunami is economic  
Theme [Development philosophies]; 
Theme [Future Desires]; Theme [Past 
reflection] 
Lack of economic diversity, nurturing of 
tourism monoculture 
Pleumarom, 2004; Theme [Development 
philosophies]; Dodds, 2011; Ko, 2005;  
Preference for the ‘tried and tested’ 
model of tourism development 
UNDP; Theme [Future Desires]; Theme 
[Development philosophies] 
Complacency born of competitive success Theme [Development philosophies]; 
Nwankwo and Richardson, 1994; Argenti, 
1976 
Failure to see the interconnectedness of 
environmental viability and economic 
sustainability 
Theme [Conceptualisations of 
sustainability]; Theme [Development 
philosophies] 
Island still does not have a robust system 
of basic infrastructure 
Theme [Needs]; Theme [Community 
Challenges]; Brix, 2007; Ghobarah et al., 
2006; Dodds et al., 2010 
Fear, confusion and improper 
communication surrounding future plans 
for the island were met with suspicion 
and resistance 
Theme [Communication]; Theme [Future 
Plans]; Theme [Fear]; Theme [Conflict]; 
Rice, 2005; Altman, 2005 
Inaction and delays in the release of 
plans, caused islanders to forge ahead 
illegally with rebuilding as there was an 
immediate need to secure livelihoods 
Rice, 2005; Theme [Barriers]; Theme 
[Future Plans]; Theme [Economic 
impacts of tourism]; Theme [Conflict]; 
Theme [Lawlessness] 
Strong political-economic structures 
maintained by major Landowners who 
also have ties with local government 
deter on-going government involvement 
Theme [Power Relationships]; Theme 
[Lawlessness]; Theme [Conflict] 
The Tsunami not only creates new 
challenges but uncovered existing ones 
Theme [Influence of the Tsunami]; Theme 
[Community Challenges]; Theme 
[Conflict]; Theme [Lawlessness] 
The psychological effect of tourism 
development cannot be erased 
Theme [Economic impacts of tourism]; 
Theme [Social impacts of tourism]; 
Theme [Influence of the Tsunami] 
Table 2: Justification of the absence of a ‘clean slate’ on Phi Phi (Sources: 
Pleumarom, 2004; UNDP, 2005; Dodds, 2011; Ko, 2005; Nwankwo and Richardson, 
1994; Argenti, 1976; Rice, 2005; Altman, 2005; Brix, 2007; Ghobarah et al., 2006; 
Dodds et al., 2010 and Researcher’s own empirical evidence) 
 
There is an assumption that Phi Phi will always be a success in terms of tourism and 
therefore it is treated as a cash cow. Respondents claimed that the general attitude is 
to grab as much money as they can from the island. The warning signs noted by 
Pleumarom (2004) and Thongpra (2005) that the desire to rebuild and accommodate 
tourism again would far supersede any consideration for sustainability have been 
borne out. The importance of marketing to boost tourism seems to be a philosophy 
that is common to Thai government representatives and within discussions of 
sustainability originating in Thailand, but it does not engage in discussions of 
sustainability within literature of Western origins, adding further evidence of the 
author’s observations regarding the differences between local and global 
interpretations of sustainability and how definitions and principles which are 
Eurocentric in bias represent a poor fit for local conditions . 
 
Favourable memories of Phi Phi of the past appear to dominate within the research 
findings and seem to prevent stakeholders seeing the damage that tourism model in 
place has wrought. They do not fully ‘see’ the damage that the present form of 
tourism on the island is having. This phenomenon was similarly illustrated during a 
personal visit with a friend to the island who, when watching film footage back failed 
to recognise certain aspects of the island, noting that when taking a detached view, the 
island takes a very different shape to when you are immersed in it.  
 In respect of inhabitants, this is also evidenced. Commentators on Phi Phi liken this to 
what is called ‘boiled frog’ syndrome. This phenomenon offers an alternative way of 
comprehending destination vulnerability, which may be drawn from the notion of a 
‘boiled frog syndrome’, acknowledged within the literature surrounding strategic 
management of organisations and business failure, however to a much more limited 
extent within the literature on the strategic management of tourism destinations and 
disaster. However, the theory presents some clear parallels with the experiences on 
Phi Phi. Coined initially by Villiers in 1989 in respect of business, Richardson, 
Nwankwo, and Richardson (1994) explain that if you:  
 
put a frog into a container of hot water, it will feel the heat and jump out. Put a 
frog into cool water and then gently heat the water to boiling point and the frog 
will happily sit there unaware of the incremental, dangerous change occurring in 
its environment. This well-observed, generic form of business failure has its 
roots in the tendency of organization managers to become trapped in their own 
“boiled frog syndromes” (Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson, 1994: 4) 
 
This phenomenon is a key feature of complacent managers who remain ‘blissfully 
unaware whilst the environment around them heats up’ (Richardson et al., 1994: 4), 
something Johnson (1998) describes as strategic drift, illustrated in Figure 3. 
  
Figure 3: Strategic Drift Model (Johnson, 1998) 
 
Importantly, this model shows that inertia in changing circumstances increases the 
likelihood of a crisis. In a tourism context, Sonmez et al. (1999) recommend that 
tourism destinations vulnerable to crises should incorporate strategic crisis 
management planning into their overall sustainable development and marketing 
strategies in order to protect and rebuild a positive destination image and re-establish 
the area’s functionality. In relation to Phi Phi, this ‘strategic gap’ can be viewed in 
several ways. Firstly, a lack of action in implementing measures to manage tourism 
impacts, control the nature and volume of tourism development and developing 
sustainable tourism practices creates a crisis of tourism ‘killing the golden goose’, 
degrading the environment upon which the tourist product is based. Secondly, a lack 
of proactive action by the Thai government in terms of disaster preparation and 
complacency about the probability of such an event, a resistance to act for fear of 
harming the tourism industry exacerbated the strategic gap created by a rapidly-
changing environmental situation. A further strategic gap developed on account of 
delays by the Thai government in agreeing and delivering redevelopment plans in the 
recovery phase. This represents a further ‘crisis’ due to the time elapsed between the 
Prodromal (pre-impact) phase (Ritchie, 2004) of 26th December 2004, and Resolution 
(normal or improved state resumed), which, arguably, has still not been reached due 
to rebuilding work taking place in many areas of the island including shoreline 
developments near the pier in Tonsai and shop houses adjacent to the Wastewater 
Treatment Plant and wetlands. This notion of ‘strategic gap’ is embedded in the 
authors’ model of Vulnerability derived from her doctoral research as a factor that has 
heightened the vulnerability of Phi Phi. 
 
Many of the concepts discussed by Villiers (1989), Johnson (1988) and Richardson, 
Nwankwo and Richardson (1994) chime with the failures of Phi Phi if considered as a 
business, which the Thai inhabitants and landowners consider it to be. In particular, 
causes of failure on account of ‘boiled frog’ syndrome are identified, several of which 
the author considers pertinent to Phi Phi, as explained below: 
 
• complacency born of competitive success (as seen in the development 
philosophies theme); 
• cultural rigidity (as seen in the community and cultural issues themes); 
• a hierarchy orientation (as seen in the cultural issues theme); 
• the push for organisational growth rather than productive growth (as seen in the 
development philosophies, present and past criticism themes); and 
• low motivation amongst employees (community members, as seen in the 
communication and community themes) 
 
Argenti (1976) asserts that another factor is the nature of leadership. It is the 
landowners who appear to hold the greatest power and influence over Phi Phi’s 
development, and if one reflects on the opinions of respondents, this would be an apt 
description: 
 
An overambitious, super-salesman type who is so set on hyper-successful 
performance that he ceases to believe in the existence of failure. These people 
are noticeable for their outstanding personalities. They are leaders of men, 
loquacious, restless and charismatic (Argenti, 1976: 123) 
 
Such leaders are characterised as follows (adapted from Richardson et al., 1994:12): 
 
• they stand at the centre of the political arena (key players in planning meetings, as 
media liaison post-tsunami); 
• people in charge of organisations “milk” them to the point of bankruptcy and 
demise (density of commercial construction on land, resorts, shop houses as 
illustrated in the development philosophies theme). 
 
Whilst the age of this previous academic research on the concept of the boiled frog is 
noted, a subsequent search for more recent studies or application to the study of 
tourism development yields results applied only in the context of generic 
management. The closest application is Faulkner’s (2000) observation that the 
impacts of a threatening situation (disaster) are often only realised following a 
triggering event, implying that a gradual onset of adverse changes affords less 
recognition of a crisis situation than that of a triggering event, such as a tsunami.   
More recently still, Johnson’s (2009) work applies the boiled frog concept to 
encourage hospitality students to develop self-awareness in their attitudes to change, 
whilst Hardiman and Burgin (2010) in their research on ‘canyoning’ in the Blue 
Mountains National Park in Australia likens the lack of care for ecological damage to 
the boiled frog phenomenon. This research, however, demonstrates the relevance and 
applicability of Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson’s (1994) ideas, in order to 
comprehend how disaster vulnerability can be heightened and how a gradual onset of 
detrimental changes without remedial action being taken represents a crisis situation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Numerous authors have highlighted a relative lack of academic attention directly 
addressing the influence of political economy upon achieving sustainability in post 
disaster reconstruction (Klein, 2008; Hystad and Keller, 2008; Olsen, 2000; Bommer, 
1985; Beirman, 2003; Faulkner, 2001; Glaesser, 2003; Ritchie, 2004). This work 
therefore extends existing academic debates and studies in a number of areas. Firstly, 
in the existing academic debates concerning the political economy of post disaster 
reconstruction there is an observed trend towards, ‘disaster capitalism’, as Klein 
(2005:3) puts it, ‘smash and grab capitalism’ as Harvey (2007:32) observes, and in 
Saltman’s (2007a:57) terms, ‘attempts to accumulate by dispossession’. However, in 
Phi Phi’s case this did not occur, presenting an experience that is contrary to the 
growing trend. This work outlines the reasons why Phi Phi avoided the type of 
capitalism experienced by disaster affected tourism destinations elsewhere.  
Additionally, despite claims of a ‘clean slate’ being offered by the tsunami in 
developmental terms (Pleumarom, 2004; UNDP, 2005; Dodds, 2011; Ko, 2005; 
Nwankwo and Richardson, 1994; Argenti, 1976; Rice, 2005; Altman, 2005; Brix, 
2007; Ghobarah et al., 2006; Dodds et al., 2010), this research provides evidence and 
explanation of why a ‘clean slate’ did not and would never exist on Phi Phi, a finding 
which may be related to many other tourism destinations in a post disaster context.  
 
This has enabled the researcher to note that the island’s development followed a linear 
path of destination development and provides a perfect illustration of how shock 
events, stakeholder relationships and human agency can impact upon this predicted 
model of destination evolution. The tsunami illustrates limitations in these models in 
that it acts as an intervention in the linear path of development. Destinations 
following this intervention can take many paths. Phi Phi had an opportunity to 
reassess the development model, but sought to regain the level of development they 
had pre-tsunami as quickly as possible. One may note that while the infrastructure 
was removed, the philosophy predetermining that level of development certainly 
wasn’t. Klein’s (2008) observations on disaster capitalism, which took root in the 
notion of shock therapy, designed to erase and remake the human mind and likened to 
Friedman’s search for a ‘laissez-faire laboratory’ under which he could employ his 
capitalist ‘shock treatment’ (ibid 2008: 49), can be applied differently in this case. 
Certainly a shock did occur on Phi Phi, which presented the opportunity for disaster 
capitalism, which would be enabled through neoliberal policies, but the ideology and 
‘memory’ of the island had not been wiped clean and therefore could not be remade. 
The power of the landowners and their development hegemony did not permit this 
and was more powerful an influence than the hegemony of Western sustainability 
discourse.  
 
The researcher draws on the notion of ‘strategic drift’ (Johnson, 1998) and ‘Boiled 
frog syndrome’ (Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson, 1994) which have been 
previously applied within strategic management but to a very limited extent within 
tourism studies in order to explain how host attitudes to tourism may increase 
vulnerability. Both of these theoretical contributions can be used assist in the 
identification of destination vulnerability and to highlight limitations in disaster 
response and recovery.  The work posits that under the existing political economic 
climate, pursuit of an alternative development paradigm will not be possible and the 
island will remain highly vulnerable in line with Blaikie et al’s (1994) observations 
that the factors of vulnerability are often reconstructed following a disaster and as 
such may create frame conditions for a repeat disaster.  
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